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Abstract
Daniel Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux) 499 pp. ISBN
978-0374275631.
In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman significantly sharpens our
understanding of human decision-making and the systems of thinking that underlie it. He offers a
compelling critique of the rational-agent model, arguing that, while we can and do use reason, we often
fall back on a type of thinking that operates quickly and requires less cognitive effort but is vulnerable to
faulty belief.
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In his 2011 book, Thinking Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize-winning psychologist
Daniel Kahneman significantly sharpens our understanding of human decisionmaking and the systems of thinking that underlie it. He offers a compelling
critique of the belief that we are, generally, rational decision makers, and, in its
place, presents a much fuller theory that, while acknowledging our ability to think
rationally, emphasizes our vulnerability to cognitive processes that lead to lazy
thinking and faulty belief.
The theory that Kahneman presents had its origin in research he undertook
and published with Amos Tversky and others in the 1970s. Having first noticed
that people’s decisions were prone to mistakes, the researchers sought to isolate
and analyze the participants’ intuitive thinking and often-incorrect judgments.
This research changed widely held assumptions about human nature, according to
which behavior normally and usually proceeded from reason, except for those
occasions on which reason was overcome by emotion. People used slow and
deliberate thinking to evaluate possible solutions before making decisions, so said
the near-consensus view. Tversky and Kahneman argued, however, that, while we
can and do use reason, we often fall back on a type of thinking that is quick,
requires less effort than rational thought, and is prone to error. Although these
intuitive judgments were the focus of their research and its findings, they did not
deny that rational thinking has a place, but, instead, argued that depending on
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, both thought processes influenced decision-making.
In Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman described these dual modes, or processes,
as System 1 and System 2.
System 2 will here be considered first, because it is the very model of
reasoned deliberation Kahneman and colleagues challenged and then refined. It is
the familiar model and, as it is the loftiest, it is the one with which most people
self-identify.
This kind of thinking attempts objectivity, and, in it, we take our time to
weigh explicitly known evidence and consider alternatives before choosing a
solution. When we use System 2, we are less likely to make mistakes.
Unfortunately, it requires selective and sustained attention, which can be depleted
by difficult cognitive reasoning as well as changes in motivation and self-control.
Sometimes, people are too lazy to use System 2 thinking. It is at these moments,
and when circumstances do not allow for deliberation, that we fall back on
System 1.
System 1 thinking is associated with intuition. It operates quickly and
requires less cognitive effort, thus providing certain advantages. It is efficient in
that it speeds up the decision-making process, often necessary, Kahneman argues,
considering the many decisions we have to make every day in a world that
bombards us with information. This type of intuitive thinking is governed by
heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that we use to think and act quickly. Judgments
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and decisions we make with heuristics can be good—or good enough—but
heuristics can also lead to incorrect judgments. Kahneman cites examples of these
heuristics. Among those he cites are the representativeness heuristic and the
availability heuristic.
The representativeness heuristic is used when making judgments about the
probability of an event. It allows us automatically and easily, but sometimes
erroneously, to identify causal connections between events. We prefer an ordered
existence of causation and pattern to one of chance and random sequence, and,
when such order is not present, we will intuitively impose it. With this distortion,
subsequent mistakes are more likely. Kahneman illustrates his point using the
example of the sex of six babies born in sequence at a hospital, which is, of
course, random. The events are independent of each other, and the sex of one
baby does not determine and cannot predict the sex of another. When asked to
consider the possible birth gender sequences of BBBGGG, GGGGGG, and
BGBBGB, we intuitively do not think that these three are equally likely. People
tend to judge the last sequence as random because it “looks” random; however,
probability theory is not concerned with what may appear random but with how
events in a sequence are actually produced.
As if errors resulting from this heuristic were not enough on their own, they
can be magnified by the faith we place in small sample sizes: small samples
contain greater variability than large samples, and, if we neglect to consider this
fact, we inflate the significance of the information conveyed. An example
Kahneman gives for this particular System 1 thought flaw is $1.7 billion
ineffectively spent by the Gates Foundation to improve high-school student
achievement and boost graduation rates by creating smaller schools, often
splitting larger schools into smaller units. This initiative came as a result of the
Foundation having observed the disproportionately large number of small schools
ranked among the highest-achieving. What the Foundation neglected to consider
was the equal overrepresentation of small schools among the lowest-achieving, as
well. This overrepresentation on both ends results from the greater variability in
small samples.
There may have been an evolutionary advantage to System 1’s quick pattern
recognition/imposition and response. Quickly grouping stripes into a tiger without
pausing for contemplation may indeed cause us to flee sooner and save our necks.
But when misapplied, System 1 thinking can contribute to faulty judgments that
can, as in the small schools example, prove very costly.
Kahneman also explains what he and Tversky labeled the availability
heuristic. This heuristic is the mental shortcut that arises from examples related to
a particular problem or event coming immediately to mind. Although this
example is not presented in the book, the availability heuristic can be seen in the
belief one forms after reading a series of news stories about terrorist attacks, that
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terrorist attacks are more common than they actually are. Yet, as a widely read
article (Zenko 2012) demonstrated in recent years, Americans have the same odds
of being killed by their own furniture as by terrorism (and, no, furniture deaths are
not likely, either). The heuristic can also be seen at work in a related
phenomenon: that of people who watch more than four hours of television a day
believing, as they can easily bring to mind many particular examples of lawyers,
physicians, and professional athletes, that more people are employed in these
professions than is the case (Cantor 1994).
Or consider an “availability cascade,” in which the media presents a story
highlighting a risk that elicits concern from the public. Feelings of concern and
fear shape how people will react to additional information and the decisions they
will make, which itself is the affect heuristic, or a mental shortcut that relies on
emotion to guide decision-making. Competing media outlets continue to cover not
only the original story but also the emotional response to it, increasingly
sensationalizing and exaggerating its significance. According to Kahneman, when
experts or dispassionate voices then attempt to correct these distortions, they are
either ignored or met with hostility.
The availability heuristic also relates to judgments we make about ourselves.
If asked to list six instances in which you were aggressive and to determine how
aggressive you are, six instances probably come to mind fairly easily. Given the
ease with which they came to mind, you would be more likely to describe
yourself as aggressive. However, if asked to list twelve times you have behaved
aggressively, the task becomes a little tougher. Because you cannot immediately
recall twelve, you are less likely to describe yourself as aggressive, even if you
recalled more than six.
System 1 can also trip us up with a phenomenon known as the “peak-end
rule.” This heuristic evaluates a past experience based chiefly upon our feelings at
its most intense and at its end. This reconstruction, in which we make an entire
experience align with its two most easily remembered moments, whether or not
these moments were in fact typical, even helps determine our happiness—
regardless of its accuracy. In one case, patients who each underwent a
colonoscopy that lasted for a short time but ended at a point of peak pain were
compared to patients for whom the procedure lasted longer and had the same pain
intensity but ended with no pain after having peaked relatively earlier. One might
suspect, and rationally so, that a quick ending to a painful procedure is most
appreciated by such patients, but the results Kahneman presents are surprising.
Patients who endured the greater suffering of a longer procedure that ended
without pain reported it as more pleasant than did those who underwent a shorter
procedure that ended at the time of greatest pain.
The many glitches of System 1 form some of the most interesting content in
Thinking Fast and Slow; every bit as fascinating are the ways in which Systems 1
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and 2 interact and work in tandem to minimize effort and optimize performance.
System 1 generates impressions and feelings. If System 2 endorses them, these
become beliefs, which in turn drive subsequent decisions and behavior. More
often than not, System 2 simply accepts what System 1 sends it, and all runs
smoothly enough. When, however, System 2 registers error or its potential, it
asserts itself and summons more cognitive resources. System 2 can fail and, when
it does, we fall back on System 1, all the while conning ourselves with a freshly
created narrative that argues our reason is, in fact, in control. This rationalization
is as quick as it is easy.
Although not presented in the book, it is interesting to note here that this
automatic tendency to create a story and even invent missing details to fill in the
gaps in our memory has also been observed in split-brain patients (Gazzaniga
1998). Split-brain procedure is used to treat severe epilepsy by cutting the corpus
collosum, the bundle of fibers connecting the right and left hemispheres of the
brain. One’s left hemisphere processes information presented to the right visual
field, but it is also responsible for speech production; one can say what this
hemisphere sees. Information presented to the left visual field, however, is
processed by the right hemisphere, but because in the split-brain procedure the
fibers connecting hemispheres have been cut, this sensory data cannot be
transferred to the left hemisphere for speech. In an experiment with a split-brain
patient, researchers presented a picture of a snow scene to the patient’s right
hemisphere and a picture of a chicken foot to the left hemisphere. Four cards were
placed in front of the patient, and he was asked to pick a card with his left hand
and a card with his right hand related to what he saw. His left hand pointed to a
shovel, and his right hand pointed to a chicken. When asked why he chose those
items, his left hemisphere said that the chicken went with the chicken claw, and,
without missing a beat, said that he picked the shovel because you need to clean
out the chicken shed. The left hemisphere, having no plausible explanation,
invented one. We create consistent and believable narratives that make sense of
our experiences and memories. Gazzaniga’s examples confirms, with physiology,
the very thing Kahneman argues in Thinking Fast and Slow, which is the strength
and quickness of our readiness to creatively resolve dissonance and lacunae.
Thinking Fast and Slow presents, in a highly accessible manner, a practical
theory of human cognition and behavior, incorporating research that spans a
generation. A fascinating text for both laymen and professionals, it has rightly
earned much acclaim and leaves the reader with a solid foundation in intuition
and reasoning. The importance of this book cannot be overstated, and it should be
read by anyone who wishes to understand the dual processes underlying human
decision-making and judgment.
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